There are many motives of not bombarding Hanoi, but the intention and what were the possible results of this act must have counted against this. Upon the first of the Tet Offensive, from January to February 1972, a massive assault chiefly targeted Hanoi, well aware that the U.S. military operations were dead on. As such, it damaged the city severely considering that troops and war material that transited through it so greatly a proportion of military joins for black operations was emplaced in their gardens or carelessly done even at serious damage done to the infrastructure and urban settlements.
These risks were combined with long-range considerations-the absence of cloud cover. One prime basis for not having bombed Hanoi stemmed from how this act would be perceived in the international community, foremost that of the U.S. Nonetheless, given that the revolution had begun, along with other allies chose to side with the Vietnamese, and public support for the US involvement has grown because of visible congressional publicity. Along with this were considerations of the chance of aligned bombing on Hanoi increasing additional tensions between these two countries upon which further intervention was made in the Asian direction.